g to him, we do not
know things in themselves, i. e. things independent of the mind. In
particular, we cannot know that they are spatial; and the objection
quoted concedes this. On the other hand, we do know phenomena or
the appearances produced by things in themselves. Phenomena or
appearances, however, as he always insists, are essentially states or
determinations of the mind. To the question, therefore, 'Why are we
justified in saying that we do know phenomena, whereas we do not know
the things which produce them?' Kant could only answer that it is
because phenomena are dependent upon the mind, as being its own
states.[14] As the objector is made to say, 'the reality of the object
of our internal senses (of myself and my state) is immediately clear
through consciousness.' If we do not know things in themselves,
because they are independent of the mind, we only know phenomena
because they are dependent upon the mind. Hence Kant is only justified
in denying that we know things in themselves if he concedes that we
really know our own states, and not merely appearances which they
produce.

[14] Cf. p. 123.

Again, Kant must allow--as indeed he normally does--that these states
of ours are related by way of succession. Hence, since these states
are really our states and not appearances produced by our states,
these being themselves unknown, time, as a relation of these states,
must itself be real, and not a way in which we apprehend what is real.
It must, so to say, be really in what we apprehend about ourselves,
and not put into it by us as perceiving ourselves.

The objection, then, comes to this. Kant must at least concede that
we undergo a succession of changing states, even if he holds that
_things_, being independent of the mind, cannot be shown to undergo
such a succession; consequently, he ought to allow that time is not a
way in which we apprehend ourselves, but a real feature of our real
states. Kant's answer[15] does not meet the point, and, in any case,
proceeds on the untenable assumption that it is possible for the
characteristic of a thing to belong to it as perceived, though not
in itself.[16]

[15] B. 55, M. 33 med.

[16] Cf. pp. 71-3.

CHAPTER VI

KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

Kant's theory of space, and, still more, his theory of time, are
bewildering subjects. It is not merely that the facts with which he
deals are complex; his treatment of them is also complicated by his
speci