zed that the transition
was more than one of phraseology he must have seen that it was
necessary to recast his argument.

[4] This is Kant's way of putting the question which should
be expressed by asking, 'Are things spatial, or do they only
look spatial?'

[5] B. 43, M. 26. Cf. _Prol._, Sec. 9 fin. with Sec. 10 init.

It may be said, then, that Kant is compelled to end with a different
distinction from that with which he begins. He begins with the
distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as
they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same
reality regarded from two different points of view. He ends with the
distinction between two different realities, things-in-themselves,[6]
external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena
or appearances within it. Yet if his _argument_ is to be valid, the
two distinctions should be identical, for it is the first distinction
to which the argument appeals.[7] In fact, we find him expressing what
is to him the same distinction now in the one way and now in the other
as the context requires.

[6] It should be noticed that 'things-in-themselves' and
'things as they are in themselves' have a different meaning.

[7] Cf. p. 55 and ff.

The final form of Kant's conclusion, then, is that while things in
themselves are not, or, at least, cannot be known to be spatial,
'phenomena,' or the appearances produced in us by things in
themselves, are spatial. Unfortunately, the conclusion in this form is
no more successful than it is in the former form, that things are
spatial only as perceived. Expressed by the formula 'phenomena are
spatial', it has, no doubt, a certain plausibility; for the word
'phenomena' to some extent conceals the essentially mental character
of what is asserted to be spatial. But the plausibility disappears on
the substitution of 'appearances'--the true equivalent of Kant's
_Erscheinungen_--for 'phenomena'. Just as it is absurd to describe the
fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that, while the stick is
not bent, the appearance which it produces is bent, so it is, even on
the face of it, nonsense to say that while things are not spatial, the
appearances which they produce in us are spatial. For an 'appearance',
being necessarily something mental, cannot possibly be said to be
extended. Moreover, it is really an abuse of the term 'appearance' to
speak of appearances _produced