xion with these qualities.
Thus it is difficult and, in the end, impossible to say that a bell
_appears_ noisy, or that sugar _appears_ sweet. We say, rather, that
the bell and the sugar produce certain sensations[21] in us.

[20] Cf. pp. 72-3, and 91.

[21] _Not_ 'appearances'.

The case of colour, however, is more difficult. From the closeness of
its relation to the shape of bodies, it seems to be a real quality of
bodies, and not something relative to a sensitive subject like the
other secondary qualities. In fact, so intimate seems the relation of
colour to the shape of bodies, that it would seem--as has, of course,
often been argued--that if colour be relative to a sensitive subject,
the primary qualities of bodies must also be relative to a sensitive
subject, on the ground that shape is inseparable from colour.[22] Yet
whether this be so or not, it must, in the end, be allowed that colour
does presuppose a sensitive subject in virtue of its own nature, and
quite apart from the difficulty--which is in itself insuperable--of
determining the right colour of individual bodies. It must, therefore,
be conceded that colour is not a quality of bodies. But if this be
true, the use of the term 'look' or 'appear' in connexion with colour
involves a difficulty which does not arise when it is used in
connexion with the primary qualities. Bodies undoubtedly look or
appear coloured. Now, as has already been suggested,[23] the term
'look' seems to presuppose some identity between what a thing is and
what it looks, and at least the possibility of cases in which they are
what they look--a possibility which, as we have seen, is realized in
the case of the primary qualities. Yet, if colour is not a quality of
bodies, then, with respect to colour, things look what they never are,
or, in other words, are wholly different from what they look;[24] and
since it seems impossible to hold that colour is really a property of
bodies, this conclusion must, in spite of its difficulty, be admitted
to be true.

[22] Cf. p. 91 note.

[23] Cf. p. 82.

[24] It is assumed that there is not even plausibility in the
supposition of continuity or identity between colour proper
and its physical conditions in the way of light vibrations.

There remain, however, to be noticed two respects in which assertions
concerning what things look in respect of colour agree with
corresponding assertions in respect of the primary qual