at this cannot be analysed into anything
more simple and, in particular, into a statement about
'appearances'. Even in the case of looking at the candle,
there is no need to speak of two 'appearances' or 'images'.
Before we discover the truth, the proper assertion is 'The
body which we perceive looks as if it were two candles', and,
after we discover the truth, the proper assertion is 'The
candle looks as if it were in two places'.

We may now turn to the way in which we draw the distinction with
respect to the secondary qualities of physical things. It must, it
seems, be admitted that in our ordinary consciousness we treat these
qualities as real qualities of bodies. We say that a bell is noisy;
that sugar is sweet; that roses smell; that a mustard plaster is hot;
that the sky is blue. It must also be admitted that in our ordinary
consciousness we draw a distinction between appearance and reality
_within_ these qualities, just as we do _within_ the primary
qualities. Just as we speak of the right or real shape of a body, so
we speak of its right or real colour, taste, &c., and distinguish
these from its apparent colours, taste, &c., to some individual. We
thereby imply that these qualities are real qualities of bodies, and
that the only difficulty is to determine the particular character of
the quality in a given case. Yet, as the history of philosophy shows,
it takes but little reflection to throw doubt on the reality of these
qualities. The doubt arises not merely from the apparent impossibility
of finding a principle by which to determine the right or real quality
in a given case, but also and mainly from misgivings as to the
possible reality of heat, smell, taste, noise, and colour apart from a
percipient. It must also be admitted that this misgiving is well
founded; in other words, that these supposed real qualities do
presuppose a percipient, and therefore cannot be qualities of things,
since the qualities of a thing must exist independently of the
perception of the thing.[20] This will readily be allowed in the case
of all the secondary qualities except colour. No one, it may
reasonably be said, who is familiar with and really faces the issue,
will maintain that sounds, smells, tastes, and sensations of touch
exist apart from a sensitive subject. So much is this the case, that
when once the issue is raised, it is difficult and, in the end,
impossible to use the word 'appear' in conne