elves or things in relation to one
another; that is, it does not represent any determination of things
which would attach to the objects themselves and would remain, even
though we abstracted from all subjective conditions of perception. For
neither absolute nor relative[56] determinations of objects can be
perceived prior to the existence of the things to which they belong,
and therefore not _a priori_."[57] It is, of course, implied that in
experience, where we do not discover determinations of objects prior
to the existence of the objects, we do apprehend determinations of
things as they are in themselves, and not as they are in relation to
us. Thus we should expect the conclusion to be, not that all that we
know is phenomenal--which is Kant's real position--but that spatial
(and temporal) relations alone are phenomenal, i. e. that they alone
are the result of a transmutation due to the nature of our perceiving
faculties.[58] This conclusion would, of course, be absurd, for what
Kant considers to be the empirically known qualities of objects
disappear, if the spatial character of objects is removed. Moreover,
Kant is prevented by his theory of perception from seeing that this is
the real solution of his problem, absurd though it may be. Since
perception is held to arise through the origination of sensations by
things in themselves, empirical knowledge is naturally thought of as
knowledge about sensations, and since sensations are palpably within
the mind, and are held to be due to things in themselves, knowledge
about sensations can be regarded as phenomenal.

[56] The first sentence shows that 'relative determinations'
means, not 'determinations of objects in relation to us', but
'determinations of objects in relation to one another.' Cf.
B. 37, M. 23; and B. 66 fin., 67 init., M. 40 (where these
meanings are confused).

[57] B. 42, M. 26.

[58] This conclusion is also to be expected because,
inconsistently with his real view, Kant is here (B. 41-2, M.
25-6) under the influence of the presupposition of our
ordinary consciousness that in perception we are confronted
by things in themselves, known to be spatial, and not by
appearances produced by unknown things in themselves. Cf. (B.
41, M. 25) "and thereby of obtaining immediate representation
of them [i. e. objects];" and (B. 42, M. 26) "the receptivity
of the subject to be affected by objects necessari