erts itself, and reasserts itself so strongly as
to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalisation that the
command depends upon the battle-fleet.

Of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this hairsplitting? Why
not leave untainted the conviction that our first and foremost business is
to crush the enemy's battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort
should be concentrated? The answer is to point to Nelson's dilemma. It was
a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every admiral at sea
had had to solve for himself, and it was always one of the most difficult
details of every naval war plan. If we seek to ensure the effective action
of the battle-fleet by giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much
do we weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. If we seek to
make that control effective by devoting to the service a large proportion
of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our chance of getting contact with
and defeating the enemy's battle-fleet, which is the only means of
perfecting control.

The correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend upon the
conditions of each case--mainly upon the relative strength and activity of
the hostile battle-fleet and our enemy's probable intentions. But no matter
how completely we have tabulated all the relevant facts, we can never hope
to come to a sound conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all
the elements which go to give command, and without the power of gauging
their relative importance. This, and this alone, will ultimately settle the
vital question of what proportion of our cruiser force it is right to
devote to the battle-fleet.

If the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every cruiser attached
to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its true function. Such
withdrawals are inevitable. A squadron of battleships is an imperfect
organism unable to do its work without cruiser assistance, and since the
performance of its work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must
be sacrificed. But in what proportion? If we confine ourselves to the view
that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we shall attach to it such a
number as its commander may deem necessary to make contact with the enemy
absolutely certain and to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. If
we knew the enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course
might be justified. But the normal condit