ive if a reasonable alternative existed.

The principles, then, which we distil from this, the original case of
"seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative,
and, secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation
is complete. The idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present,
unless we find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the Elizabethan
admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the Armada was by
its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving port before it had settled
down.

In our next naval struggle with the Dutch in the latter half of the
seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we have seen, became
fully developed. It was the keynote of the strategy which was evolved, and
the conditions which forced it to recognition also emphasised the
principles of seeking out and destroying. It was a case of a purely naval
struggle, in which there were no military considerations to deflect naval
strategy. It was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the risk of
missing contact which had cramped the Elizabethans in their oceanic theatre
was a negligible factor. Yet fresh objections to using the "seeking out"
maxim as a strategical panacea soon declared themselves.

The first war opened without any trace of the new principle. The first
campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely with the attack and
defence of trade, and such indecisive actions as occurred were merely
incidental to the process. No one appears to have realised the fallacy of
such method except, perhaps, Tromp. The general instructions he received
were that "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to
the English," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to sail to the
damage and offence of the English fleet, and also to give convoy to the
west." Seeing at once the incompatibility of the two functions, he asked
for more definite instructions. What, for instance, was he to do if he
found a chance of blockading the main English fleet at its base? Was he to
devote himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of merchantmen to
be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing frigates," or was he to continue
his escort duty? Full as he was of desire to deal with the enemy's main
fleet, he was perplexed with the practical difficulty--too often
forgotten--that the mere domination of the enemy's battle strength does not
solve the problem of control of the