, the converse was almost always true. The attempt of the enemy to
use his army against our territory has been the most fertile source of our
great naval victories. The knowledge that our enemy intends to invade these
shores, or to make some serious expedition against our oversea dominions or
interests, should always be welcomed. Unless History belie herself, we know
that such attempts are the surest means of securing what we want. We have
the memories of La Hogue, Quiberon, and the Nile to assure us that sooner
or later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a real
decision is all we can ask of the Fortune of War.

Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is
not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. What the maxim really
means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the
best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as
soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will
permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in the Japanese and
American cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be
subordinated to the movement of the army, otherwise we give the defensive
precedence of the offensive. If, however, the military offensive cannot be
ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the
enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move
must be to secure naval contact.

The vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. If we assume the
maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek out the enemy wherever he
may be, it means in its nakedness that we merely conform to the enemy's
dispositions and movements. It is open to him to lead us wherever he likes.
It was one of the fallacies that underlay all Napoleon's naval
combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals would behave
in this guileless manner. But nothing was further from their cunning. There
is a typical order of Cornwallis's which serves well to mark their
attitude. It was one he gave to Admiral Cotton, his second in command, in
July 1804 on handing over to his charge the Western Squadron off Ushant:
"If the French put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels seeing
them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure of the course they
have taken. If you leave the entrance of the Channel without protection,
the enemy might profit by it, an