turn. If, on the
other hand, as in the case of the Dutch wars, the lines do traverse home
waters, a home concentration is all that is required. Our division will
then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and by the extent
to which we feel able to detach squadrons for offensive action against the
enemy's distant maritime interests without prejudicing our hold on the home
terminals of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly he
moves. These remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet operations. If
such an enemy has distant colonial bases from which he can annoy our trade,
minor concentrations must naturally be arranged in those areas.

Next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are widely
distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify the problem by
leaving some of them open so as to entice him to concentrate and reduce the
number of ports to be watched. For if we do this, we leave the unwatched
squadrons free for sporadic action. Unless we are sure he intends to
concentrate with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying
the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere
effectually with sporadic action. Then, sporadic action being denied him,
the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate.

The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be so arranged that
any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense
into a mass at any point in the area of concentration. The object of
holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our
actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same
time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that
is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent
any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every
detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. The ideal
concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality
of strength.

* * * * *

PART THREE

CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTORY

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I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE
CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA

Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles in a definite
manner to the