have meant a
purely defensive attitude. It would have meant waiting to be struck instead
of seeking to strike, and such an attitude was arch-heresy to our old
masters of war.

So far we have only considered concentration as applied to wars in which we
have a preponderance of naval force, but the principles are at least
equally valid when a coalition places us in inferiority. The leading case
is the home campaign of 1782. It was strictly on defensive lines. Our
information was that France and Spain intended to end the war with a great
combined effort against our West Indian islands, and particularly Jamaica.
It was recognised that the way to meet the threat was to concentrate for
offensive action in the Caribbean Sea everything that was not absolutely
needed for home defence. Instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough
to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make sure of the
area that was most critical. To do this the home fleet had to be reduced so
low relatively to what the enemy had in European waters that offence was
out of the question.

While Rodney took the offensive area, Lord Howe was given the other. His
task was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of home waters
as would place our trade and coasts at their mercy, and it was not likely
to prove a light one. We knew that the enemy's plan was to combine their
attack on the West Indies with an attempt to control the North Sea, and
possibly the Straits of Dover, with a Dutch squadron of twelve to fifteen
of the line, while a combined Franco-Spanish fleet of at least forty sail
would occupy the mouth of the Channel. It was also possible that these two
forces would endeavour to form a junction. In any case the object of the
joint operations would be to paralyse our trade and annoy our coasts, and
thereby force us to neglect the West Indian area and the two Spanish
objectives, Minorca and Gibraltar. All told we had only about thirty of the
line on the home station, and though a large proportion of these were
three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea till the summer.

Inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of a purely
passive defence. It would not meet the case. Something must be done to
interfere with the offensive operations of the allies in the West Indies
and against Gibraltar, or they would attain the object of their home
campaign. It was resolved to effect this by minor counterstrokes on their