an this, the idea seems to be rooted in the oldest traditions
of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the conviction of the sea service that
war is primarily a question of battles, and that battles once joined on
anything like equal terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has
had nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. The
Cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles lasting three,
and even four, days. Their creed is enshrined in the robust article of war
under which Byng and Calder were condemned; and in the apotheosis of Nelson
the service has deified the battle idea.

It is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have lost its colour,
but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in the British conception of
naval warfare, that there would be nothing left to say but for the
unavoidable modification with which we have to temper the doctrine of
overthrow. "Use that means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can
and when you must." Devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not
always possible or wise to act upon it. If we are strong, we press to the
issue of battle when we can. If we are weak, we do not accept the issue
unless we must. If circumstances are advantageous to us, we are not always
able to effect a decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not
always obliged to fight. Hence we find the apparently simple doctrine of
the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most difficult
problems that beset our old admirals. The most thorny questions they had to
decide were these. In the normal case of strength, it was not how to defeat
the enemy, but how to bring him to action; and in casual cases of temporary
weakness, it was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the
fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy the
decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his ulterior object.

From these considerations it follows that we are able to group all naval
operations in some such way as this. Firstly, on the only assumption we can
permit ourselves, namely, that we start with a preponderance of force or
advantage, we adopt methods for securing command. These methods, again,
fall under two heads. Firstly, there are operations for securing a decision
by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we shall be chiefly
concerned with methods of bringing an unwilling enemy to action, and with
the value to that end of