. In like manner the second war was characterised by three great
naval actions, one of which, after Monk had resumed command, lasted no less
than four days. The new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. So
entirely was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, that
no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. In our own case
at least, massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no thought
was given to sustaining it by reliefs. Consequently our offensive power
suffered periods of exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base,
and the Dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own
trade, but to strike severely at ours. Their counterstrokes culminated in
the famous attack upon Sheerness and Chatham. That such an opportunity was
allowed them can be traced directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine.
In the belief of the British Government the "St. James's Fight"--the last
of the three actions--had settled the question of command. Negotiations for
peace were opened, and they were content to reap the fruit of the great
battles in preying on Dutch trade. Having done its work, as was believed,
the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and the
Dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the limitations of the abused
doctrine. The lesson is one we have never forgotten, but its value is half
lost if we attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet
doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its possibilities.

The truth is, that we had not obtained a victory sufficiently decisive to
destroy the enemy's fleet. The most valuable lesson of the war was that
such victories required working for, and particularly in cases where the
belligerents face each other from either side of a narrow sea. In such
conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat and the
restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision is not to be looked
for without very special strategical preparation. The new doctrine in fact
gave that new direction to strategy which has been already referred to. It
was no longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his fleet
the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his fleet in such a
way as to lead to decisive action. Merely to seek him out on his own coasts
was to ensure that no decisive action would take place. Measures had to be
taken to force him to sea away from his own base