dreaded a new fit of Spanish revolutionary contagion in Italy; the
Emperor Alexander imagined himself called upon to maintain the security
of all thrones and the peace of the world; England, without caring much
for the success of the Spanish revolution, was extremely anxious that
Spain should continue entirely independent, and that French influence
should not prevail in the Peninsula. The French Government had to deal
with a question not only delicate and weighty in itself, but abounding
with still more important complications, and which might lead to a
rupture with some, if not with the whole of her allies.
M. de Villele on succeeding to office, had no very defined ideas as to
foreign affairs, or any decidedly arranged plans beyond an unbiassed
mind and sensible predilections. During his short association with the
Cabinet of the Duke de Richelieu, he had closely observed the policy
adopted towards Spain and Italy,--a peaceful policy of non-intervention,
and of sound advice to kings and liberals, to liberals as to kings, but
of little efficacy in act, and tending, above all other considerations,
to keep France beyond the vortex of revolutions and counter-revolutions,
and to prevent a European conflagration. In the main, M. de Villele
approved of this policy, and would have desired nothing better than to
continue it. He was more occupied with internal government than external
relations, and more anxious for public prosperity than diplomatic
influence; but, in the accomplishment of his views, he had to contend
against the prepossessions of his party, and in this struggle his two
principal associates, M. de Montmorency, as Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and M. de Chateaubriand, as ambassador at London, contributed
more embarrassment than assistance.
On the formation of the Cabinet, he proposed to the King to give
M. de Montmorency the portfolio of foreign affairs. "Take care," replied
Louis XVIII. "He has a very little mind, somewhat prejudiced and
obstinate; he will betray you, against his will, through weakness. When
present, he will say he agrees with you, and may perhaps think so at the
time; when he leaves you, he will suffer himself to be led by his own
bias, contrary to your views, and, instead of being aided, you will be
thwarted and compromised." M. de Villele persevered; he believed that,
with the right-hand party, the name and influence of M. de Montmorency
were of importance. Not long after, he had an opportu
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