induced him to take with the other Powers the
precise initiative, and to enter into the very engagements, he had been
instructed to avoid. M. de Chateaubriand, who filled only a secondary
post in the official negotiation, kept at first a little on the
reserve: "I do not much like the general position in which he has
placed himself here," wrote M. de Montmorency to Madame Recamier;[17]
"he is looked upon as singularly sullen; he assumes a stiff and uncouth
manner, which makes others feel ill at ease in his presence. I shall use
every effort, before I go, to establish a more congenial intercourse
between him and his colleagues." M. de Montmorency had no occasion to
trouble himself much to secure this result. As soon as he had taken his
departure, M. de Chateaubriand assumed a courteous and active demeanour
at the Congress. The Emperor Alexander, alive to the reputation of the
author of the 'Genius of Christianity,' and to his homage to the founder
of the 'Holy Alliance,' returned him compliment for compliment, flattery
for flattery, and confirmed him in his desire of war with the Spanish
revolution, by giving him reason to rely, for that course of policy and
for himself, upon his unlimited support. Nevertheless, in his
correspondence with M. de Villele, M. de Chateaubriand still expressed
himself very guardedly: "We left," said he, "our determination in doubt;
we did not wish to appear impracticable; we were apprehensive that, if
we discovered ourselves too much, the President of the Council would not
listen to us."

I presume that M. de Villele fell into no mistake as to the pretended
doubt in which M. de Chateaubriand endeavoured to envelop himself. I
also incline to think that he himself, at that epoch, looked upon a war
with Spain as almost inevitable. But he was still anxious to do all in
his power to avoid it, if only to preserve with the moderate spirits,
and the interests who dreaded that alternative, the attitude and
reputation of an advocate for peace. Sensible men are unwilling to
answer for the faults they consent to commit. As soon as he ascertained
that M. de Montmorency had promised at Verona that his Government would
take such steps at Madrid, in concert with the three Northern Powers, as
would infallibly lead to war, M. de Villele submitted to the King in
council these premature engagements, declaring at the same time that,
for his part, he did not feel that France was bound to adopt the same
line of con