t led to no
profitable result either for Spain or France. It surrendered up Spain to
the incapable and incurable tyranny of Ferdinand VII., without putting
an end to revolutions; and substituted the barbarities of popular
absolutism for popular anarchy. Instead of securing the influence of
France beyond the Pyrenees, it compromised and annulled it to such an
extent that, towards the close of 1823, it was found necessary to have
recourse to the mediation of Russia, and to send M. Pozzo di Borgo to
Madrid to compel Ferdinand VII. to select more moderate advisers. The
Northern Powers and England alone retained any credit in Spain,--the
first with the King and the Absolutists, the latter with the Liberals;
victorious France was there politically vanquished. In the eyes of
clear-sighted judges, the advantageous and permanent effects of the war
were of no more value than the causes.

As an expedient of restless policy, as a mere _coup-de-main_ of dynasty
or party, the Spanish war fully succeeded. The sinister predictions of
its opponents were falsified, and the hopes of its advocates surpassed.
Brought under proof together, the fidelity of the army and the impotence
of the conspiring refugees were clearly manifested. The expedition was
easy but not inglorious, and added much to the personal credit of the
Duke d'Angouleme. The prosperity and tranquillity of France received no
check. The House of Bourbon exhibited a strength and resolution which
the Powers who urged it on scarcely expected; and England, who would
have restrained the effort, submitted to it patiently, although with
some dissatisfaction. Regarding matters in this light only,
M. de Chateaubriand was correct in writing to M. de Villele from Verona,
"It is for you, my dear friend, to consider whether you ought not to
seize this opportunity, which may never occur again, of replacing France
in the rank of military powers, and of re-establishing the white
cockade, in a short war almost without danger, and in favour of which
the opinion of the Royalists and of the army so strongly impels you at
this moment." M. de Villele was mistaken in his answer: "May God grant,"
said he, "for my country and for Europe, that we may not persist in an
intervention which I declare beforehand, with the fullest conviction,
will compromise the safety of France herself."

After such an event, in which they had taken such unequal shares, the
relative positions of these two statesmen became