English Cabinet. These last
overtures proved as futile as the preceding ones. At Madrid they had no
confidence in the French Ministry; and the Government of London placed
too little dependence either on the power or discretion of that of
Madrid, to commit itself seriously by engaging the latter, through the
weight of English influence, to submit to the concessions, otherwise
reasonable, which France required. Affairs had reached the point at
which the ablest politicians, without faith in the efficacy of their own
views, were unwilling to adopt decided measures.

On the 28th of January, 1823, M. de Villele determined on war, and the
King announced this decision in his speech on opening the session of
both Chambers. Nevertheless eight days later, M. de Chateaubriand
declared to Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Paris, that,
far from dreaming of establishing absolute power in Spain, France was
still ready to entertain the constitutional modifications she had
proposed to the Spanish Government, "as sufficient to induce her to
suspend hostile preparations, and to renew friendly intercourse between
the two countries on the old footing." At the very moment of engaging in
war, M. de Chateaubriand, who desired, and M. de Villele, who was averse
to, these extreme measures, equally endeavoured to escape from the
responsibility attached to them.

I have nothing to say on the war itself and the course of its incidents.
In principle it was unjust, for it was unnecessary. The Spanish
revolution, in spite of its excesses, portended no danger to France or
the Restoration. The differences to which it gave rise between the two
Governments might have been easily arranged without violating peace. The
revolution of Paris, in February, 1848, produced much more serious and
better-founded alarms to Europe in general, than the Spanish revolution
in 1823 could have occasioned to France. Nevertheless Europe, with
sound policy, respected towards France the tutelary principle of the
internal independence of nations, which can never be justly invaded
except under an absolute and most urgent necessity. Neither do I think
that in 1823 the throne and life of Ferdinand VII. were actually in
danger. All that has since occurred in Spain justifies the conclusion,
that regicide has no accomplices there, and revolution very few
partisans. The great and legitimate reasons for war were therefore
wanting. In fact, and notwithstanding its success, i