ce kept in a perpetual
state of irritation against a power, moderate without ascendency, and
clever without greatness. But when M. de Chateaubriand and the 'Journal
des Debats' threw themselves into the combat, there was then seen to
muster round them an army of anti-ministerialists of every origin and
character, composed of royalists and liberals, of old and young France,
of the popular and the aristocratic throng. The weak remains of the
left-hand party, beaten in the recent elections, the seventeen old
members of the Opposition, liberals or doctrinarians, drew breath when
they looked on such allies; and, without confounding their ranks, while
each party retained its own standard and arms, they combined for mutual
support, and united their forces against M. de Villele.
M. de Chateaubriand has gratified himself by inserting in his Memoirs
the testimonies of admiration and sympathy proffered to him at that time
by M. Benjamin Constant, General Sebastiani, M. Etienne, and other heads
of the liberal section. In the Parliamentary struggle, the left-hand
party could only add to the opposers of the right a very small number of
votes; but they brought eminent talents, the support of their journals,
their influence throughout the country; and, in a headlong, confused
attack,--some under cover of the mantle of Royalism, others shielded by
the popularity of their allies,--they waged fierce war against the
common enemy.

In presence of such an Opposition, M. de Villele fell into a more
formidable danger than that of the sharp contests he had to encounter to
hold ground against it: he was given over without protection or refuge
to the influence and views of his own friends. He could no longer awe
them by the power of the left-hand party, nor find occasionally in the
unsettled position of the Chamber a bulwark against their demands. There
had ceased to be a formidable balance of oppositionists or waverers; the
majority, and a great majority, was ministerial and determined to
support the Cabinet; but it had no real apprehension of the
adversaries by whom it was attacked. It preferred M. de Villele to
M. de la Bourdonnaye and M. de Chateaubriand, believing him more capable
of managing with advantage the interests of the party; but if
M. de Villele went counter to the wishes of that majority, if it ceased
to hold a perfect understanding with him, it could then fall back on
MM. de Chateaubriand and de la Bourdonnaye. M. de Villele had