only such checks upon the people, if indeed they can
be called checks, as are calculated to insure the deliberate expression
of the popular will. Constitutional provisions designed to obstruct
amendment are not only an anomaly in popular government, but they are in
the very nature of the case inoperative. This follows from the fact that
the law-making body, whether it be the people themselves or a
representative assembly, is the final interpreter of the constitution
and may enact laws which virtually amend it. To make such provisions
really effective the constitution must vest the power to prevent
legislation in some branch of government not directly responsible to the
people. Usually this is a King or hereditary class. Our Constitution,
however, provides a substitute for these in its general system of checks
and especially in the independence of our national judiciary, which in
addition to the exercise of ordinary judicial functions is also
practically a branch of the legislature. The constitutional status of
the judiciary will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

No part of our Constitution has received less adverse criticism than
that which relates to the powers and tenure of the judiciary.
Constitutional writers have almost without exception given it their
unqualified approval, claiming that its wisdom is established beyond
question by the political experience of the English-speaking race. To
express a doubt as to the soundness of this view is to take issue with
what appears to be the settled and mature judgment of the American
people.

Moreover, the authority of the courts is "the most vital part of our
government, the part on which the whole system hinges."[52] This is true
for the reason that the Federal judiciary is not only the most important
of our constitutional checks on the people, but is also the means of
preserving and enforcing all the other checks. To enable the Federal
judges to exercise these important and far-reaching powers, it was
necessary to make them independent by giving them a life tenure. This
provision was in perfect harmony with the general plan and purpose of
the Constitution, a document framed, as we have seen, with a view to
placing effectual checks on the power of the majority. As a means to the
end which the framers of the Constitution had in view, the independence
of the judiciary was an admirable arrangement.

Hamilton says: "Upon th