desire to strengthen a conservative
branch of the government rather than by any desire to copy the English
Constitution, or the constitutions of the American states. As a matter
of fact, the veto power of the Crown was then obsolete, Hamilton himself
remarking in the Convention that it had not been used since the
Revolution of 1688,[116] while in all but two states the last vestige
of it had been destroyed.[117]

The position of the President was still further strengthened by
discarding the executive council which then existed in every state as a
check upon the governor and which was a prominent feature of the English
government of that time. In England this council, forming the Ministry
or Cabinet, had not, it is true, definitely assumed the form which
characterizes it now; but it had deprived the King of all power to act
except through ministers who were responsible and could be impeached by
Parliament. This, of course, had greatly weakened the executive, a fact
which fully explains why the framers of the Constitution rejected it and
went back to the earlier English king whose veto power was unimpaired
for their model.

As their plan contemplated a strong independent executive who would not
hesitate to use the far-reaching powers placed in his hands to defeat
measures which he disapproved of, it was necessary to guarantee him
against popular removal. In this respect again we see both English and
American constitutional practice disregarded, since neither afforded the
desired security of tenure. In the various states the governor was
liable to be impeached by the lower branch of the legislature and
expelled from office when convicted by the senate, which was usually the
court before which impeachment cases were tried. A mere majority in
each house was usually sufficient to convict,[118] and as both houses
were directly elected,[119] it virtually gave the majority of the voters
the power to remove. This was simply an adaptation of the English
practice which allowed a majority of the Commons to impeach and a
majority of the Lords to convict. That this had a strong tendency to
make the legislative body supreme is evident, since the power, if freely
used, would overcome all opposition on the part of either the executive
or the judiciary. Any combination of interests that could command a
majority in both houses of Parliament could thus enforce its policy.
This practically destroyed the executive check in the English
Cons