relinquishment of
the veto power in the case of political questions. This self-imposed
restriction on its authority merely affords it a convenient means of
placing beyond its jurisdiction measures which it may neither wish to
approve nor condemn. And since the court must decide what are and what
are not political questions, it may enlarge or narrow the scope and
meaning of the word _political_ to suit its purposes. As a matter of
fact, then, the power which it appears to have voluntarily surrendered,
it still largely retains.

Upon the whole, the Supreme Court has been remarkably fortunate in
escaping hostile criticism. Very rarely have its decisions and policy
been attacked by any organized party. In the platform of the Republican
party of 1860 the strong pro-slavery attitude of the court was, it is
true, severely denounced. But from that time until 1896 no party dared
to raise its voice in criticism of the Federal judiciary. Both the
Democratic and the Populist platforms of the latter date, however,
condemned the Income Tax decision and government by injunction. The
Democratic platform also hinted at the possible reorganization of the
Supreme Court--the means employed by the Republican party to secure a
reversal of the Legal Tender decision of 1869.

This comparative freedom from criticism which the Supreme Court has
enjoyed until recent years does not indicate that its decisions have
always been such as to command the respect and approval of all classes.
It has from the beginning had the full confidence of the wealthy and
conservative, who have seen in it the means of protecting vested
interests against the assaults of democracy. That the Supreme Court has
largely justified their expectations is shown by the character of its
decisions.

During the first one hundred years of its history two hundred and one
cases were decided in which an act of Congress, a provision of a state
constitution or a state statute, was held to be repugnant to the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, in whole or in part.
Twenty of these involved the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
One hundred and eighty-one related to the Constitution or the statute of
a state. In fifty-seven instances the law in question was annulled by
the Supreme Court on the ground that it impaired the obligation of
contracts. In many other cases the judicial veto was interposed to
prevent what the court considered an unconstitutional exercise of th