ouse of Representatives, in theory at least, could defeat the treaty by
refusing its assent to the necessary appropriation. In practice,
however, the House has surrendered this power. A treaty is at no stage
"submitted to or referred to the House of Representatives, which has no
more right to be informed about it than ordinary citizens. The President
and the Senate may, for example, cede or annex territories, and yet
nothing of the fact will appear in the discussions of the House of
Representatives unless the cession involves expenditure or receipt of
money. Besides, I must add that even if the treaty contains clauses
imposing a charge on the public revenue, it is the rule, since
Washington's time, that the House of Representatives should not discuss
the terms of the treaty adopted by the Senate, but accept it in silence
as an accomplished fact, and simply vote the necessary funds."[113]

The appointing power was in many respects even more important. It meant
the right to select those who were to interpret and enforce the laws,
and this really involved the power to mold the spirit and character of
the government. That this was fully appreciated by those who framed the
Constitution we saw in the preceding chapter.

The statement contained in the Constitution that all legislative
authority is vested in Congress is far from accurate, not only for the
reason above indicated that a portion of it under the guise of
treaty-making power is conferred on the President and Senate, and the
further reason that the Supreme Court exercises legislative authority of
great importance, but for the additional reason that the President,
aside from his control over treaties, possesses legislative power
co-extensive and co-equal with that of either house. He has been
expressly given by the Constitution only a qualified veto, but it is so
difficult for Congress to override it by the necessary two-thirds
majority that it is in most cases as effective as an absolute
negative.[114] Attention has been called to the fact that a two-thirds
majority is difficult to secure even under the most favorable
circumstances; but here the situation is such as to place practically
insurmountable obstacles in the way of its attainment. As an
illustration let us suppose that each state is solidly for or against
the measure which the President has vetoed and that both Senators and
Representatives accurately reflect the sentiment of their respective
states. Then t