lic opinion. As a matter of fact,
Hamilton had no use whatever for a political system which assumed that
the people were a _master_ or _principal_ and the government merely
their _servant_ or _agent_. The chief merit of the Constitution from his
point of view was not its acceptance, but its repudiation of this
principle. Had it been framed on the theory that the will of the people
is the supreme law of the land, no one would have been more bitterly
opposed to its adoption than Hamilton himself. That he gave it his
unqualified support is the best evidence that he did not believe that it
would make the will of the people supreme.

No intelligent man who carefully reads Hamilton's argument in defence of
the Federal judiciary could be misled as to his real views. His dread of
democracy is clearly seen in his desire to exalt the Supreme Court and
subordinate Congress, the only branch of the government in which the
people were directly represented. His seeming anxiety lest the
legislative body should disregard the will of the people was a mere
demagogic attempt to conceal his real motive. Had this been what he
really feared, the obvious remedy would have been the complete
responsibility of Congress to the people. In fact, this was necessarily
implied in the doctrine of principal and agent which he professed to
accept, but which found no recognition either in the constitution which
he himself had suggested, or in the one finally adopted. To this theory
of government the system which he defended was in reality diametrically
opposed. Under the guise of protecting the people against
misrepresentation at the hands of Congress, it effectually limited the
power of the people themselves by tying the hands of their responsible
agents. It deprived the people of the power to compel the enactment of
law by making the consent of the Supreme Court necessary to the
enforcement of all legislation, federal and state. This was a
substantial compliance with Hamilton's proposal to give an absolute veto
to an independent and permanent executive. It was a matter of but
little consequence whether this power was conferred on a single person,
as the President, or on a body, as the Supreme Court, provided the
manner of appointment and tenure of those in whose hands it was placed,
were such as to ensure an independent exercise of the power thus
conferred. The result would be the same in either case: the law-making
power would be placed beyond the reach