smuch as his approval in a legislative
capacity does not bar his subsequent disapproval as an executive. Of
course, it does not follow that this power is openly and avowedly
exercised. Usually it is not. An easier and more effective method is the
one which obscures the real intention of the executive by a sham attempt
at enforcement.

It may be contended that the Constitution makes it his duty to enforce
all laws without regard to his own views of their wisdom or expediency.
This contention, however, does not appear to be borne out by the purpose
of the Constitution itself. It was not the intention of the framers of
that instrument to make the President a mere administrative agent of
Congress, but rather to set him over against that body and make him in a
large measure the judge of his own authority. If it be claimed that it
is his duty to enforce all laws that have been regularly enacted, it
must at the same time be conceded that the Constitution permits their
non-enforcement, since it has given neither to Congress nor to the
people any effective power to remove him for neglect of duty. Moreover,
his oath of office does not expressly bind him to enforce the laws of
Congress, but merely to "execute the office of President ... and
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States."[120]

This omission can not be satisfactorily explained as a mere oversight.
The Massachusetts constitution of 1780, from which the fathers copied
the qualified veto power, required the governor to take an oath in which
he obligated himself to perform the duties of his office "agreeably to
the rules and regulations of the constitution and the laws of the
commonwealth." There was no precedent in any then existing state
constitution for expressly binding the executive in his oath of office
to defend the Constitution without mentioning his duty to enforce the
laws. It is a reasonable inference that the framers of the Constitution
intended to impress the President with the belief that his obligation to
defend the Constitution was more binding upon him than his duty to
enforce the laws enacted by Congress.

In the foregoing discussion it has been shown that political authority
was unequally divided between the various branches of the government;
to the extent that this was the case the framers of the Constitution
did not adhere consistently to the theory of checks. But in this, as in
other instances where they departed from pre