endments and other
legislation. And since the Crown has lost the veto power and the House
of Commons established its right to override the opposition of the House
of Lords, the most radical changes may be made without even the checks
which impede ordinary legislation in the United States.
In France amendment of the Constitution is almost as easy as in England,
though a distinction is made between this and ordinary legislation. When
both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies decide by an absolute majority
in each that amendment is necessary, they meet in joint session as a
National Assembly for that purpose. An absolute majority of the members
composing the National Assembly is required to change the Constitution.
Amendments to the Federal Constitution of Australia may be proposed by
an absolute majority of both Houses of Parliament. Not less than two nor
more than six months after the proposed amendment has been passed by
both houses, it must be submitted to the qualified voters in each
state. But if either house by an absolute majority passes a proposed
amendment which is rejected by the other house, and passes it again by
an absolute majority after an interval of three months, the
Governor-General may submit the proposed amendment to the qualified
voters. A proposed amendment is adopted if it is approved by a majority
of all those voting and also by a majority in a majority of the states.
In Switzerland the question whether the Federal Constitution ought to be
amended must be submitted to a popular vote whenever demanded by either
house of the Federal Assembly or by fifty thousand voters (about
one-fifteenth of the voting population). A proposed amendment is adopted
if it receives a majority of all the votes cast and at the same time a
majority in a majority of the Cantons, a provision copied, as we have
seen, in the Federal Constitution of Australia.
These constitutions show the general tendency at the present time to
make the majority supreme. In the countries which have been most
influenced by democratic ideas constitutional barriers against change
have largely or wholly disappeared. A constitution is in no proper sense
the embodiment of the will of the people unless it recognizes the right
of the majority to amend. Checks which prevent legal and political
readjustment are a survival from monarchy and aristocracy and are not
found in any full-fledged democracy. Constitutions which are really
democratic contain
|