fact in the Virginia convention. He observed that the division of power
in all other governments ancient and modern owed its existence to a
mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.[104] This artificial
division of power provided for in the Constitution of the United States
was intended as a substitute for the natural checks upon the people
which the existence of king and nobility then supplied in England.
This idea of government carried out to its logical conclusion would
require that every class and every interest should have a veto on the
political action of all the others. No such extended application of the
theory has ever been made in the actual working of government, nor is it
practicable, since no class can acquire, or having acquired, retain a
veto on the action of the government unless it is large and powerful
enough to enforce its demands. The attempt on the part of a small class
to acquire a constitutional right of this character must of necessity
fail. This is why the system which theoretically tends toward a high
degree of complexity has not in practice resulted in any very complex
constitutional arrangements.
Poland is the best example of the practical working of a system of
checks carried to an absurd extreme. The political disintegration and
final partition of that once powerful country by its neighbors was due
in no small degree to its form of government, which invited anarchy
through the great power which it conferred upon an insignificant
minority.
The fact that this system can not be carried far enough in practice to
confer upon every distinct interest or class the veto power as a means
of self defence, has given rise to the doctrine of _laissez faire_. No
class in control of the government, or even in possession of the power
to negative its acts, has any motive for advocating the let-alone
theory. Its veto power affords it adequate protection against any
harmful exercise of political authority. But such is not the case with
those smaller or less fortunate classes or interests which lack this
means of self-protection. Since they do not have even a negative control
over the government, they naturally desire to limit the scope of its
authority. Viewed in this light we may regard the _laissez faire_
doctrine as merely supplementary to the political theory of checks and
balances.
It is easy to see that if the idea of checks were carried out in
practice to its extreme limits, it would le
|