the smallest states, that do not collectively contain one-tenth part of
the population of the United States, may obstruct the most salutary and
necessary amendments. Nay, in these four states, six-tenths of the
people may reject these amendments.... A bare majority in these four
small states may hinder the adoption of amendments; so that we may
fairly and justly conclude that one-twentieth part of the American
people may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and
oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments.... Is this an easy mode
of securing the public liberty? It is, sir, a most fearful situation,
when the most contemptible minority can prevent the alteration of the
most oppressive government; for it may, in many respects, prove to be
such."[36]

That such a small minority of the people should have the power under our
constitutional arrangements to prevent reform, can hardly be reconciled
with the general belief that in this country the majority rules. Yet
small as was this minority when the Constitution was adopted, it is much
smaller now than it was then. In 1900 one forty-fourth of the population
distributed so as to constitute a majority in the twelve smallest states
could defeat any proposed amendment. As a matter of fact it is
impossible to secure amendments to the Constitution, unless the
sentiment in favor of change amounts almost to a revolution. Only at
critical times in our history have constitutional amendments been
adopted. During sixty-one years from 1804 to 1865, and since 1870, no
amendments have been made. The fifteen amendments were all adopted,
either during the turbulent period of American politics which
immediately followed the ratification of the Constitution, or during
the reconstruction period after the Civil War. That it is not possible
in ordinary times to change the Constitution is evident from the fact
that of some twenty-two hundred propositions for amendment only fifteen
have been adopted, and these during the periods above mentioned.[37]

"The argument in favor of these artificial majorities," says Professor
Burgess, "is that innovation is too strong an impulse in democratic
states, and must be regulated; that the organic law should be changed
only after patience, experience and deliberation shall have demonstrated
the necessity of the change; and that too great fixedness of the law is
better than too great fluctuation. This is all true enough; but, on the
other h