ntrol. In
fact, popular control was what they were seeking to avoid. One means of
accomplishing this was to make amendment difficult, and this accordingly
was done. We need not be surprised that no provision was made for its
original adoption, or subsequent amendment by direct popular vote.[35]

The fact that the people can not directly propose, or even ratify
changes in the fundamental law, is a substantial check upon democracy.
But in addition to this, another check was provided in the extraordinary
majority necessary to amend the Constitution. That it requires a
two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress, or an application from
the legislature in two-thirds of the states to merely set the machinery
for constitutional amendment in motion, and that it requires for
ratification of amendments proposed, the assent of legislatures or
conventions in three-fourths of the states, ought to give one some idea
of the extreme difficulty of changing our Constitution.

Patrick Henry clearly saw that this lack of adequate provision for
amendment was destructive of democracy. In the Virginia convention held
to ratify the Constitution he said:

"To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us that there is a plain, easy
way of getting amendments. When I come to contemplate this part, I
suppose that I am mad, or that my countrymen are so. The way to
amendment is, in my conception, shut ..." After quoting Article V (the
amendment feature of the Constitution), he continues:

"Hence it appears that three-fourths of the states must ultimately agree
to any amendments that may be necessary. Let us consider the consequence
of this.... Let us suppose--for the case is supposable, possible and
probable--that you happen to deal those powers to unworthy hands; will
they relinquish powers already in their possession, or agree to
amendments? Two-thirds of Congress, or of the state legislatures, are
necessary even to propose amendments. If one-third of these be unworthy
men, they may prevent the application for amendments; but what is
destructive and mischievous, is, that three-fourths of the state
legislatures, or of the state conventions, must concur in the amendments
when proposed! In such numerous bodies, there must necessarily be some
designing, bad men. To suppose that so large a number as three-fourths
of the states will concur, is to suppose that they will possess genius,
intelligence, and integrity, approaching to miraculous.... For four of