sentatives throughout the States may be
two thousand. Their personal influence will, therefore, be
proportionably more extensive than that of one or two hundred men in
Congress. The State establishments of civil and military officers of
every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible
correspondent establishments in the general government, will create such
an extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secure the
predilection and support of the people. Whenever, therefore, Congress
shall meditate any infringement of the State constitutions, the great
body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic
representatives. Can the general government withstand such an united
opposition? Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their
privileges? Will they suffer their Legislatures to be reduced to a
shadow and a name? The idea is shocking to common-sense.
From the circumstances already explained, and many others which might be
mentioned, results a complicated, irresistible check, which must ever
support the existence and importance of the State governments. The
danger, if any exists, flows from an opposite source. The probable evil
is, that the general government will be too dependent on the State
Legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious
to their humors; that the States, with every power in their hands, will
make encroachments on the national authority, till the Union is weakened
and dissolved.
Every member must have been struck with an observation of a gentleman
from Albany. Do what you will, says he, local prejudices and opinions
will go into the government.
What! shall we then form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these
prejudices? Shall we confirm the distemper, instead of remedying it. It
is undeniable that there must be a control somewhere. Either the general
interest is to control the particular interests, or the contrary. If the
former, then certainly the government ought to be so framed, as to
render the power of control efficient to all intents and purposes; if
the latter, a striking absurdity follows; the controlling powers must be
as numerous as the varying interests, and the operations of the
government must therefore cease; for the moment you accommodate these
different interests, which is the only way to set the government in
motion, you establish a controlling power. Thus, whatever constitutional
provisions are made to t
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