pted. When, therefore, direct taxes are not necessary,
they will not be recurred to. It can be of little advantage to those in
power, to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people. To consult
the conveniences of the people, will cost them nothing, and in many
respects will be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be
recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other nations those
immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labor? Not the
expenses of their governments, but war. If this country should be
engaged in war, (and I conceive we ought to provide for the possibility
of such a case,) how would it be carried on? By the usual means provided
from year to year? As our imports will be necessary for the expenses of
government, and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the
means of defence? How is it possible a war could be supported without
money or credit? And would it be possible for government to have credit,
without having the power of raising money? No, it would be impossible
for any government, in such a case, to defend itself. Then, I say, sir,
that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies,
and give this power to the general government; for the utter inutility
of previous requisitions on the States is too well known. Would it be
possible for those countries, whose finances and revenues are carried to
the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of government on
great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, without an
uncontrolled power of raising money? Has it not been necessary for Great
Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collection of her taxes, to
have recourse very often to this and other extraordinary methods of
procuring money? Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was
known that her power to raise money was limited? Has not France been
obliged, on great occasions, to recur to unusual means, in order to
raise funds? It has been the case in many countries, and no government
can exist unless its powers extend to make provisions for every
contingency. If we were actually attacked by a powerful nation, and our
general government had not the power of raising money, but depended
solely on requisitions, our condition would be truly deplorable: if the
revenues of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct
authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations.
This must be obvious to every mem