upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own
consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a government
established by the thirteen States of America, not through the
intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this
particular respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed
governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from
the dependent, derivative authority of the legislatures of the States;
whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we
look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same
idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system, a majority of the
States cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the States required for
that purpose; three fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this
there is a departure from the federal idea. The members to the national
House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in
proportion to the numbers in the respective districts. When we come to
the Senate, its members are elected by the States in their equal and
political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated,
the Senate would have been chosen by the people, in their individual
capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house. Thus it
is of complicated nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found
to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere
confederacy. If Virginia were separated from all the States, her power
and authority would extend to all cases; in like manner, were all powers
vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government;
but the powers of the federal government are enumerated; it can only
operate in certain cases: it has legislative powers on defined and
limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.

But the honorable member has satirized, with peculiar acrimony, the
powers given to the general government by this Constitution. I conceive
that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be
necessary; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either
submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the Union. Let us consider
the most important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation
is most generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies of
government, there is no question but the most easy mode of providing for
them will be ado