he facility of a combination, and preclude all likelihood of
intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, whether they will attend to
the interests of their constituent States. Have not those gentlemen who
have been honored with seats in Congress often signalized themselves by
their attachment to their States? Sir, I pledge myself that this
government will answer the expectations of its friends, and foil the
apprehensions of its enemies. I am persuaded that the patriotism of the
people will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties, and
that the tendency of the Constitution will be, that the State
governments will counteract the general interest, and ultimately
prevail. The number of the representatives is yet sufficient for our
safety, and will gradually increase; and if we consider their different
sources of information, the number will not appear too small.
Sir, that part of the proposed Constitution which gives the general
government the power of laying and collecting taxes, is indispensable
and essential to the existence of any efficient, or well organized
system of government: if we consult reason, and be ruled by its
dictates, we shall find its justification there: if we review the
experience we have had, or contemplate the history of nations, there too
we shall find ample reasons to prove its expediency. It would be
preposterous to depend for necessary supplies on a body which is fully
possessed of the power of withholding them. If a government depends on
other governments for its revenues; if it must depend on the voluntary
contributions of its members, its existence must be precarious. A
government that relies on thirteen independent sovereignties for the
means of its existence, is a solecism in theory, and a mere nullity in
practice. Is it consistent with reason, that such a government can
promote the happiness of any people? It is subversive of every principle
of sound policy, to trust the safety of a community with a government
totally destitute of the means of protecting itself or its members. Can
Congress, after the repeated unequivocal proofs it has experienced of
the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisitions, reasonably expect
that they would be hereafter effectual or productive?
Will not the same local interests, and other causes, militate against a
compliance? Whoever hopes the contrary must for ever be disappointed.
The effect, sir, cannot be changed without a removal of the cause.
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