ber here: I think, therefore, that it
is necessary for the preservation of the Union, that this power should
be given to the general government.
But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined to the power of
direct taxation, will give it a tendency to destroy all subordinate
authority; that its increasing influence will speedily enable it to
absorb the State governments. I cannot bring myself to think that this
will be the case. If the general government were wholly independent of
the governments of the particular States, then indeed, usurpation might
be expected to the fullest extent: but, sir, on whom does this general
government depend? It derives its authority from these governments, and
from the same sources from which their authority is derived. The members
of the federal government are taken from the same men from whom those of
the State legislatures are taken. If we consider the mode in which the
federal representatives will be chosen, we shall be convinced, that the
general never will destroy the individual governments; and this
conviction must be strengthened by an attention to the construction of
the Senate. The representatives will be chosen, probably under the
influence of the State legislatures: but there is not the least
probability that the election of the latter will be influenced by the
former. One hundred and sixty members representing this commonwealth in
one branch of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and
must ever possess more influence than the few men who will be elected to
the general legislature. Those who wish to become federal
representatives, must depend on their credit with that class of men who
will be the most popular in their counties, who generally represent the
people in the State governments: they can, therefore, never succeed in
any measure contrary to the wishes of those on whom they depend. So
that, on the whole, it is almost certain that the deliberations of the
members of the federal House of Representatives will be directed to the
interests of the people of America. As to the other branch, the Senators
will be appointed by the legislatures, and, though elected for six
years, I do not conceive they will so soon forget the source whence they
derive their political existence. This election of one branch of the
federal, by the State legislatures, secures an absolute independence of
the former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of one third will
lessen t
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