nterest. The influence of
these is as powerful as the most permanent conviction of the public
good; and against this influence we ought to provide. The local
interests of a State ought in every case to give way to the interests of
the Union; for when a sacrifice of one or the other is necessary, the
former becomes only an apparent, partial interest, and should yield, on
the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one.
When you assemble from your several counties in the Legislature, were
every member to be guided only by the apparent interests of his county,
government would be impracticable. There must be a perpetual
accommodation and sacrifice of local advantages to general expediency;
but the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by
this important principle. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the
Senate should be so formed, as to be unbiased by false conceptions of
the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good of their
several States.
Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable apprehensions of danger to the
State governments; they seem to suppose that the moment you put men into
a national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all
their affection for their fellow-citizens. But can we imagine that the
Senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage, as to
sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents? The State
governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit of the
general system. As long, therefore, as Congress has a full conviction of
this necessity, they must, even upon principles purely national, have as
firm an attachment to the one as to the other. This conviction can never
leave them, unless they become madmen. While the constitution continues
to be read, and its principle known, the States must, by every rational
man, be considered as essential, component parts of The Union; and
therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to the latter is wholly
inadmissible.
The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of
State governments, which will ever give them an important superiority
over the general government. If we compare the nature of their different
powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall
find the advantage entirely on the side of the States. This
consideration, important as it is, seems to have been little attended
to. The aggregate number of repre
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