well as to points of
learning that are more remote and unusual: that the whole tendency of my
design may the more easily be perceived, the conclusions better descend,
and the force of them be better felt. I shall not think much of my pains
in this cause, as I engaged in it from principle. I was solicited to
argue this cause as Advocate-General; and because I would not, I have
been charged with desertion from my office. To this charge I can give a
very sufficient answer. I renounced that office, and I argue this cause
from the same principle; and I argue it with the greater pleasure, as it
is in favor of British liberty, at a time when we hear the greatest
monarch upon earth declaring from his throne that he glories in the name
of Briton, and that the privileges of his people are dearer to him than
the most valuable prerogatives of his crown; and as it is in opposition
to a kind of power, the exercise of which in former periods of history
cost one king of England his head, and another his throne. I have taken
more pains in this cause than I ever will take again, although my
engaging in this and another popular cause has raised much resentment.
But I think I can sincerely, declare, that I cheerfully submit myself to
every odious name for conscience' sake; and from my soul I despise all
those whose guilt, malice, or folly has made them my foes. Let the
consequences be what they will, I am determined to proceed. The only
principles of public conduct, that are worthy of a gentleman or a man,
are to sacrifice estate, ease, health, and applause, and even life, to
the sacred calls of his country.

These manly sentiments, in private life, make the good citizens; in
public life, the patriot and the hero. I do not say that, when brought
to the test, I shall be invincible. I pray God I may never be brought to
the melancholy trial, but if ever I should, it will be then known how
far I can reduce to practice principles which I know to be founded in
truth. In the meantime I will proceed to the subject of this writ.

Your honors will find in the old books concerning the office of a
justice of the peace, precedents of general warrants to search suspected
houses. But in more modern books, you will find only special warrants to
search such and such houses, specially named, in which the complainant
has before sworn that he suspects his goods are concealed; and will find
it adjudged, that special warrants only are legal. In the same manner