r the establishment of a republican government, on a safe and
solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every honest man in the
United States, and I presume that I shall not be disbelieved, when I
declare, that it is an object of all others, the nearest and most dear
to my own heart. The means of accomplishing this great purpose become
the most important study which can interest mankind. It is our duty to
examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to choose the best
and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from nature, from reason,
from examples, the best principles of policy, and to pursue and apply
them in the formation of our government. We should contemplate and
compare the systems, which, in this examination, come under our view;
distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and excellencies of each,
and discarding the former, incorporate the latter, as far as
circumstances will admit, into our Constitution. If we pursue a
different course and neglect this duty, we shall probably disappoint the
expectations of our country and of the world.
In the commencement of a revolution, which received its birth from the
usurpations of tyranny, nothing was more natural, than that the public
mind should be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist
these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of
all our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty became
predominant and excessive. In forming our confederation, this passion
alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than
to secure ourselves from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable
one, and deserved our utmost attention. But, sir, there is another
object equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little
capable of regarding: I mean a principle of strength and stability in
the organization of our government, and vigor in its operations. This
purpose can never be accomplished but by the establishment of some
select body, formed peculiarly upon this principle. There are few
positions more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic,
some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate
passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. It is
evident, that a body instituted for these purposes, must be so formed as
to exclude as much as possible from its own character, those infirmities
and that mutability which it is designed to remedy
|