sts and of
doubtful expediency in view of the almost certain rejection of it by the
United States Senate and of its probable effect on any plan for general
disarmament, I was not entirely satisfied because I could not disregard
the fact that an argument could be made in its favor which was not
without force.

The United States entered the war to check the progress of the
autocratic imperialism of Germany. That purpose became generally
recognized before the victory was won. In making peace it was deemed,
therefore, a matter of first importance to make impossible a revival of
the aggressive spirit and ambitious designs of Germany. The prevailing
bitterness against France because of the territorial cessions and the
reparations demanded by the victor would naturally cause the German
people to seek future opportunity to be revenged. With a population
almost, if not quite, double that of the French Republic, Germany would
be a constant menace to the nation which had suffered so terribly in the
past by reason of the imperialistic spirit prevalent in the German
Empire. The fear of that menace strongly influenced the French policies
during the negotiations at Paris. In fact it was hard to avoid the
feeling that this fear dominated the conduct of the French delegates and
the attitude of their Government. They demanded much, and recognizing
the probable effect of their demands on the German people sought to
obtain special protection in case their vanquished enemy attempted in
the future to dispossess them by force of the land which he had been
compelled to surrender or attempted to make them restore the
indemnity paid.

Whether France could have avoided the danger of German attack in the
future by lessening her demands, however just they might be, is neither
here nor there. It makes little practical difference how that question
is answered. The important fact is that the settlements in favor of
France under the Treaty were of a nature which made the continuance of
peace between the two nations doubtful if Germany possessed the ability
to regain her military strength and if nothing was done to prevent her
from using it. In these circumstances a special protective treaty seemed
a practical way to check the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the
Germans into another war of invasion.

However valid this argument in favor of the two treaties of assistance,
and though my personal sympathy for France inclined me to satisfy her
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