any question in regard to it in the case of the port of Danzig. The
Italian orators and press were not disturbed by the inconsistency of
their positions, and the Italian statesmen at Paris, when their
attention was called to it, replied that the cases were not the same, an
assertion which it would have been difficult to establish with facts or
support with convincing arguments.
While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy,
additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, were
given to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson was
almost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim to
Fiume. It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that these
statesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that the
influence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilson
as they had been led to believe. It was an unpleasant awakening. They
were placed in a difficult position. Too late to calm the inflamed
temper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had no
alternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since the
failure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to the
Orlando Ministry.
Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connected
with the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go so
far as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Question
was first settled to their satisfaction. In a memorandum dated March 29,
I wrote: "This will cause a dangerous crisis," and in commenting on the
probable future of the subject I stated:
"My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private
interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to
abandon their extravagant claim. I am sure that he will not be able
to do it. On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather
than weaken Italian determination. He ought to tell them _now_ that
he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy. It would cause
anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment
which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much
longer. I shall tell the President my opinion at the first
opportunity. [I did this a few days later.]
"The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an
explosion before the matter is settled. It is a good thing that the
President visited Italy
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