ion on
the day before the Treaty was delivered to the German plenipotentiaries
stating in substance that his promise to enter into the alliance formed
a part of the settlements as fully as if written into the Treaty. I told
him that personally I considered an agreement to negotiate the treaty of
assistance a mistake, as it discredited Article 10 of the Covenant,
which he considered all-important, and as it would, I was convinced, be
the cause of serious opposition in the United States. He replied that he
considered it necessary to adopt this policy in the circumstances, and
that, at any rate, having passed his word with M. Clemenceau, who was
accepting the Treaty because of his promise, it was too late to
reconsider the matter and useless to discuss it.
Subsequently the President instructed me to have a treaty drafted in
accordance with a memorandum which he sent me. This was done by Dr.
James Brown Scott and the draft was approved and prepared for signature.
On the morning of June 28, the same day on which the Treaty of
Versailles was signed, the protective treaty with France was signed at
the President's residence in the Place des Etats Unis by M. Clemenceau
and M. Pichon for the French Republic and by President Wilson and myself
for the United States, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour signing at the
same time a similar treaty for Great Britain. Though disagreeing with
the policy of the President in regard to this special treaty it would
have been futile for me to have refused to accept the full powers issued
to me on June 27 or to have declined to follow the directions to act as
a plenipotentiary in signing the document. Such a course would not have
prevented Mr. Wilson from entering into the defensive alliance with
France and Great Britain and might have actually delayed the peace.
Feeling strongly the supreme necessity of ending the existing state of
war as soon as possible I did not consider that I would be justified in
refusing to act as the formal agent of the President or in disobeying
his instructions as such agent. In view of the long delay in
ratification of the Treaty of the Peace, I have since doubted whether I
acted wisely. But at the time I was convinced that the right course was
the one which I followed.
In spite of the fact that my judgment was contrary to the President's as
to the wisdom of negotiating this treaty because I considered the policy
of doing so bad from the standpoint of national intere
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