shes, my judgment, as an American Commissioner, was that American
interests and the traditional policies of the United States were against
this alliance. Possibly the President recognized the force of the
argument in favor of the treaty and valued it so highly that he
considered it decisive. Knowing, however, his general attitude toward
French demands and his confidence in the effectiveness of the guaranty
in the Covenant, I believe that the controlling reason for promising the
alliance and negotiating the treaty was his conviction that it was
necessary to make this concession to the French in order to secure their
support for the Covenant and to check the disposition in certain
quarters to make the League of Nations essentially a military coalition
under a general international staff organized and controlled by
the French.
There were those who favored the mutual guaranty in the Covenant, but
who strongly opposed the separate treaty with France. Their objection
was that, in view of the general guaranty, the treaty of assistance was
superfluous, or, if it were considered necessary, then it discredited
the Covenant's guaranty. The argument was logical and difficult to
controvert. It was the one taken by delegates of the smaller nations who
relied on the general guaranty to protect their countries from future
aggressions on the part of their powerful neighbors. If the guaranty of
the Covenant was sufficient protection for them, they declared that it
ought to be sufficient for France. If France doubted its sufficiency,
how could they be content with it?
Since my own judgment was against any form of guaranty imposing upon the
United States either a legal or a moral obligation to employ coercive
measures under certain conditions arising in international affairs, I
could not conscientiously support the idea of the French treaty. This
further departure from America's historic policy caused me to accept
President Wilson's "guidance and direction ... with increasing
reluctance," as he aptly expressed it in his letter of February 11,
1920. We did not agree, we could not agree, since our points of view
were so much at variance.
Yet, in spite of the divergence of our views as to the negotiations
which constantly increased and became more and more pronounced during
the six months at Paris, our personal relations continued unchanged; at
least there was no outward evidence of the actual breach which existed.
As there never had be
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