Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty
and administration.

"Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence,
since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept
troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on
maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone
would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up.

"The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15
to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2)
To have a Japanese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated
by her, i.e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory
around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory,
but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What
then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory
as are of no value.

"The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces
of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a
more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to
the port. Why take two years to go through this operation?

"If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the
contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the
empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated.

"If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it
cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy.

"If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to
the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan.

"We shall be sowing dragons' teeth.

"It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is
desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice
and freedom.

"Sincerely yours

"THE PRESIDENT

"T.H. BLISS"

I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the Japanese
delegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amounted
to nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and without
substantial value.

The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April
30), by which he was fully advised of the attitude of General Bliss, Mr.
White, and myself in regard to the Japanese claims, the Council of Four
reached its final decision of the matter, in which n