FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179  
180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   >>   >|  
Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to take that position. Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which they could not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; or possibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt of Japanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of the Japanese Government in regard to China. There can be little doubt that political, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude of the European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question. President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previous commitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of the Japanese Government. The subject had been frequently considered during the early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergence of views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to the resumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the lease and the concessions to Germany. These views were further strengthened by the presentation of the question before the Council of Ten. On January 27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinese delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo spoke on behalf of China. In a note on the meeting I recorded that "he simply overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument." I believe that that opinion was common to all those who heard the two presentations. In fact it made such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support Japan's contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directly to China. He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard to the matter. It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim was denied. The sessions of the Commission on the League of Nations and the absence of President Wilson from Paris interrupted further consideration of the Shantung Question until the latter part of March, when the Council of Four came into being. As the subject had been fully debated in January before the Council of Ten, final decision lay with the Council of Four. What discussions took place in the latter council I do not know on account of the secrecy which was observed as to their deliberations. But I presume tha
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179  
180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

Japanese

 

Council

 

regard

 

subject

 

January

 

delegates

 

Wilson

 

President

 

Question

 

Shantung


Chinese

 

possibly

 
Government
 

States

 

United

 
contention
 

directly

 

blamed

 

support

 
common

returned

 

effect

 

called

 

impression

 
presentations
 

declaring

 

promised

 
offset
 

attempted

 

countries


decision

 

discussions

 
debated
 

deliberations

 

presume

 

observed

 

secrecy

 
council
 
account
 

happen


friendly

 

relations

 

threat

 

indirect

 

intense

 

feeling

 

matter

 
opinion
 

denied

 

interrupted