r, was due not so
much to what he did as to what he did not do. He did not hold the
supreme command in La Vendee till the most trying period of the
war was past. He did not continue the cruelties of the Jacobin
emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory
measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the
horrors of the _noyades_ and of the Terror had, even amongst
the mob of Paris, burnt itself out. He did not overthrow a
constitutional Government and enslave his country as Bonaparte
did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter,
whose opportunities he did not have. His letters show him to have
been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their
backs. In writing he called Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse 'perfide,'
and spoke of his 'mauvaise foi.' He had a low opinion of General
Humbert, whom he bracketed with Mascheret. Grouchy, he said, was
'un inconsequent paperassier,' and General Vaillant 'un miserable
ivrogne.' He was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as
of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander
of the former. Yet he and his nominee were amongst the small
fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place
where disembarkation was possible.

Notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and
of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in Bantry Bay without
encountering an English man-of-war; and a large proportion continued
in the Bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight. Is
not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who
hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion?
As a matter of fact, command of the sea--even in the case in
question--did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more
from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable.
The total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom
633 were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy,
before the expedition had got fully under way. It is not necessary
to rate Hoche's capacity very highly in order to understand that
he, who had seen something of war on a grand scale, would not
have committed himself to the command of so small a body, without
cavalry, without means of transport on land, without supplies, with
but an insignificant artillery and that not furnished with horses,
and, as was avowed, without hope of subsequent reinforcement or
of open communications with i