the case in point; because through the passion
of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while
it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this
might be prevented by excessive anger.

Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things
that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man
loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment
in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance
justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes
one quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to
clemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to
punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too
severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred
but punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
that leads one man to love another.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 2]

Whether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic.
ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease;
for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger.
Therefore neither clemency nor meekness