or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in
comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the
word of Isa. 40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no
being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man.

Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another
is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is
a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special
virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake
he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 2]

Whether Humility Has to Do with the Appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite
but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now
pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says
(Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the
body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written
(Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty."
Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem
that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks
little of oneself.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the
whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it
belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things
but the estimate thereof.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
but with the estimate of great things.

Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of