s it were, that a man is not to
be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1):
"Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets
free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission
of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that
clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_
[*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as
regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet
clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad
1).

Reply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are
delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being
reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 3]

Whether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts
of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A.
2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which
pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore
seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas
meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said
to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this is
opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
prudence rather than of temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge."
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
temperance.

_I answer that,_ Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so
far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode
whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the
mode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of
fortitude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a
certain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness
likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency