MEEKNESS
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?

(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?

(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?

(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 1]

Whether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same?

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in
inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia
ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem
that clemency and meekness are the same.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency
is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same.

Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues.
But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are
absolutely the same.

_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
(Obj. 1) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each
to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the
same.

_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is
"about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of
external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore
virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards
the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they
differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain
man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire
of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality
concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from
theft. This applies to