mitigates
punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1,
2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as
principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.

Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of
punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter
of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other
point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that
he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs
properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that
"it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking
revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of
disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful
to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency
is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there
would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to
pain others.

Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form
of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency
agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not
in matter.

Reply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as
soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition
due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind
lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs
both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason,
and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that
humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards all
other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind,
is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane
feeling which gives rise to clemency.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 4]

Whether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the
greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because
it directs man to happin