. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly
in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may
subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion
of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means
in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate
himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the other hand, due
moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as
of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,
however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an
occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with
humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4]
Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
temperance or modesty.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility
would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to
it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently
humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object,
as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not
of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).
Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or
modesty.
_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt
hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the
philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as
what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this
evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a
part of modesty or temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3,
ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
restrain or suppress, an
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