bit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the
species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be
assigned unfittingly.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of Gregory suffices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes
immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be
considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that
the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that
one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good
greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his
own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we
have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one
has not."

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus
we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he
has from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes
that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus
we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises
others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous."

Reply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First,
universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question
in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that
there is a good which is not from God, or that gra