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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 1]

Whether Humility Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a
penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They humbled his feet in
fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility
seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility
is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at
great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect"
(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
according to _Ethic._ ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would
seem not to be a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, "He hath regarded
the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the
virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were
treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in
respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been
stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appetitive movements
which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a
moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a
kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a
moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold
virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper
and restrain the mind, lest it tend to hi